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I PROLOGUE 
On the third of December, 1992, the Minister of Fisheries introduced the 
Treaty of W aitangi (Fisheries Settlement) Bill to the House. 1 The Bill was 
intended to implement an agreement for the resolution of commercial fishing 
claims arising under the Treaty of W aitangi. In return for the transfer to Maori 
of money, fishing quota and shares in the Sealords fishing company, the 
settlement of all claims and the extinguish1nent of rights to fish resources 
under the Treaty was intended. To this end clause 8 of the Bill provided that 
the obligations of the Crown in regard to commercial respectively were 
declared to be "fulfilled, satisfied and discharged." Clause 9 of the Bill stated 
that non-commercial rights were no longer of legal effect. 2 Court action, 
whether to enforce such rights and obligations or to dispute the settlement 
reached, would be rendered impossible. 
Reference was made to the need for settlement, following the success of the 
New Zealand Maori Council in the Courts,3 in order to "get the matter out of 
the courts" and allow for more certain economic development.4 Court action 
was regarded as an unnecessary and unacceptable delay:5 
"Do we want forever to beat a track to the High Court, the Appeal 
Court, and the Waitangi Tribunal? Do we not want to resolve this issue? 
What gain is there in litigating endlessly, to paying lawyers, to dividing 
the nation?" 
As might be expected, the Bill was highly controversial. Whilst there was 
considerable concern over the accountability of those involved in the 
settlement and over its precise content and structure, criticism of the 
provisions of the Bill precluding legal action was particularly strong:6 
"Not since I have been in the House have measures been brought in that 
tell people, particularly Maori people: 'Well, you can't come to the 
court; you can't go to the Waitangi Tribunal; and you can't come to the 
Crown"' 
"Parliament has no right whatsoever to take away from Maori their 
rights to go to the courts of New Zealand." 
1 NZPD, vol 532, 12816, 3 December 1992 (Hon. D L Kidd MP). 
2 Above n. 1, 12819 - 12820. 
3 Above n. l. The decisions referred to are New 'Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney-General 
[1987] 1 NZLR 641 , [1989] 2 NZLR 142, [1991] 2 NZLR 129 (No. I), [1991] 2 NZLR 
147 (No. 2), and [1992] 2 NZLR 576. 
4 Above n. 1, 12817. 
5 Above n. 1, 12827. 
6 Above n. 1, 12821 and 12833. 
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At least in part in response to such comments, the Bill was subsequently 
amended to provide simply that claims arising from rights under the Treaty 
would be deemed settled, while the rights themselves would be unaffected.7 
However, the amendment failed to assuage the concern of many members:8 
"[One] of the most basic rights of any citizen of New Zealand is the 
right of access to the courts. That right is entrenched in the English 
constitution . .. The only preservation of rights in the Bill is contained in 
clause 9, but the rights are said to be of no legal effect at all." 
Perhaps the strongest concern over the removal of such rights was expressed 
by the Hon. Peter Tapsell MP:9 
"kia ngaro nga ture tawhito o te tangata whenua, kia ngaro te iwi Maori" 
"If the old laws of the people of the land disappear, the Maori people will 
disappear." 
7 NZPD, vol. 532, 12929, 8 December 1992. For the amended provisions as enacted (note 
that a section was added prior to the passage of the Bill), see Appendix III. 
8 Above n. 7, 12938. 
9 Above n. 7, 12944. 
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II INTRODUCTION: STATIITORY RESTRICTION OF REVIEW 
Although few government actions are as momentous as the Treaty of 
Waitangi settlement described above, it may be seen that throughout the 
process of government there is a considerable tension between the desire for 
conclusive decisions and the need to protect the rights of those affected. 10 
Although there are many means by which a compromise may be found, 
ranging from informal negotiation to judicial review, the question of where 
such a line may be drawn and by whom remains. 
In most instances of administrative, as opposed to legislative, decision-
making, 11 individuals affected by an action may apply for judicial review of 
its legality. Such proceedings may give rise to a considerable number of 
remedies, including the quashing of the action concerned. 
Such consequences are understandably of concern to governments, 
particularly where the need for conclusive decisions is perceived to be 
particularly great. In addition to attempts to ensure that statutory authority is 
exercised responsibly, 12 the statutory provisions may themselves be so 
drafted as to limit the possibility of review or preclude it altogether. Such 
provisions take a variety of forms. 
Perhaps the simplest is the conferral of extremely broad authority. Such 
provisions are of course not necessarily enacted so as to restrict review: the 
complex and extensive nature of modem government often requires the grant 
of wide authority. 13 However, given that review of administrative actions is 
founded in the doctrine of ultra vires, it would seem logical that the potential 
for review reduces in inverse proportion to the breadth of the authority 
conferred. 14 Where exercise of the power is contingent on some subjective 
determination by the person exercising it, 15 the scope of review is further 
1 O T R S Allan, Law, Liberty and Justice: The Legal Foundations of British 
Constitutionalism (Clarendon, Oxford, 1993), 65. 
11 The possible existence of a judicial power of statutory review has been mentioned in the 
New Zealand Courts: Fraser v. State Services Commission [1984) I NZLR 116, 121 per 
Cooke J. Statutory review is a fundamental element of the constitutional systems of the 
United States, Australia and Canada (see text at n. 202, 206 & 211 below). 
12 M Sunkin and A P Le Sueur "Can Government Control Judicial Review?" (199 I) 44 
CLP 161. 
13 H WR Wade, Administrative Law, (6ed Clarendon, Oxford, 1988) 24. 
14 J M Evans, H N Janisch, D J Mullan and R C B Risk, Administrative Law: Cases, 
Texts and Materials (2ed Ermond Montgomery, Toronto, 1984), 531. 
l5 For example the grant of authority on the condition that the person or body exercising it 
"is satisfied" that it is necessary. For an examination of the effect of such provisions, see 
Secretary of State v. Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council [1977) AC 1014, 1047. 
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restricted, although the action must still be reasonably capable of falling 
within the terms of the statute. 16 
Another way in which review may be restricted is to provide that a particular 
action is final. 17 Such provisions are fairly common. 18 Such provisions have 
generally been interpreted to prevent appeals, 19 and to have no effect 
whatsoever on review.20 In the absence of an appeal right such provisions 
may thus be wholly superfluous.21 
A more drastic means of restricting review is to provide that a decision shall 
be treated as part of the relevant legislation. Although such provisions have 
been strongly criticised,22 and have been held not preclude review 
altogether,23 they continue to be given effectual interpretation by some 
Australian provincial courts .24 There are apparently no such provisions in 
force in New Zealand law.25 
The English Court of Appeal has accorded greater effect to "conclusive 
evidence" provisions,26 to the extent of allowing them to preclude review of 
the matter in question altogether. 27 It is however reasonable to suggest that 
such provisions may be treated more restrictively by the New Zealand 
courts.28 
Review may also be restricted by the provision of alternative remedies which 
must be exhausted prior to any proceedings. 29 In addition to the delay 
16 Reade v. Smith [1959] NZLR 996. 
17 For example, the Wild Animal Control Act 1977, s. 25(4). 
I 8 There are at least 255 finality provisions currently in force according to the STATUS 
statute database. Note, however, the limited accuracy of figures obtained by database 
searches. There is a considerable possibility that some provisions have been overlooked, 
either by reason of unusual statutory drafting or through their accidental omission from the 
database. 
19 Although note Tehrani v. Rostron [1972] QB 182, in which appeal by way of case stated 
was permitted despite the presence of a finality clause. 
20 R v. Medical Appeals Tribunal exp. Gilmore [1957] l QB 574, 585. 
21 For example R v. McMillan; exp. Metropolitan Milk Board 41 W ALR 110, 115 per 
North more CJ; "it is difficult to understand the object of finality clauses." 
22 Donoughmore Committee on Ministers Powers, Cmd 4060. 
23 Minister of Health v. Rex p. Yaffe [1931] AC 494. 
24 Attorney-General for Victoria v. Geelong City [1989] VR 641 (FC). 
25 There is, of course, some degree of uncertainty inherent in the database searches made in 
the course of this paper, for a number of reasons. These include the high probability of 
unconventional statutory formulae as well as difficulties relating to legislation which is no 
longer considered to be in force but which has not been repealed. 
26 For example, the Video Recordings Act 1987, s 29( 1): "Subject to subsection (2) of this 
section and to sections 30, 36, and 41 of this Act, a subsisting decision of the Authority . .. 
shall be conclusive evidence in any proceedings .... " 
27 R v. Registrar of Companies, exp. Central Bank of India [ 1986] QB 1114. 
28 G D S Taylor, Judicial Review: A New Zealand Perspective (Butterworths, 
Wellington,1991), 69. 
29 For example, the Casino Control Authority Act 1990, s. 98: "No person who has a 
right of appeal under section 95 of this Act ... shall be entitled - (a) To make an application 
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inherent in such a requirement, it would seem likely that there would be a 
substantial degree of attrition among potential plaintiffs. 
Perhaps most explicit, however, of the means of limiting review is the 
express exclusion of review proceedings by "privative" or "ouster" 
provisions. Statutory exclusion may take various forms, including clauses 
providing that a decision "shall not be questioned"30 and the specific removal 
of remedies. 31 Several different formulae may be employed in a single 
provision.32 Aside from the "as if enacteci" provisions discussed above, 
which are of little contemporary interest, such provisions are the clearest 
indication of a legislative intent to preclude review. It is for this reason, in 
addition to the demands of brevity, that this paper is primarily concerned with 
these provisions. 
for review of that decision under Part I of the Judicature Amendment Act 1972 ... unless 
and until that party exercises that right and the appeal is finally determined." 
30 For example, the Marketing Act 1936, s. 23. 
3 I For example, the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act 1969, s. 4A(6)(b): "The 
issue of the warrant shall not be subject to judicial review under Part I of the Judicature 
Amendment Act 1972 or otherwise." 
32 For example, the Arbitration Act 1901 (NSW), s. 32: "Proceedings in the Court shall 
not be removable to any court by certiorari or otherwise; and no award, order.or proceeding 
of the Court shall be vitiated by reason only of any want of form or liable to be challenged, 
reviewed, quashed, or called in question by any court of judicature on any account 
whatsoever." 
6 
III THE CURRENT POSITION 
A The Approach of the Courts 
It is not coincidental that the clearest expression of preclusive intent has given 
rise to the strongest judicial response. The position of the courts of New 
Zealand and of the United Kingdom33 is perhaps most readily seen in the 
statement of Lord Atkin in Ras Behari Lal v. King-Emperor that "finality is a 
good thing but justice is better. "34 Whilst Lord Atkin was referring 
specifically to a finality provision in that case, it is submitted that the 
restrictive interpretation of privative provisions reflects a general conviction 
that the restriction of review must necessarily result in a poorer and less just 
decision. Furthermore, restriction has a broader and potentially more serious 
effect of hampering the maintenance of the rule of law through the courts35 
and so undermining their constitutional position. However, although 
restrictive interpretation of privative provisions has been analysed and 
justified on these grounds,36 the approach taken by the courts has been 
substantially more complex and more subtle. 
The leading case considering privative provisions, Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign 
Compensation Commission, 37 has been described as a landmark on repeated 
occasions.38 Its significance is not, however, in its unfavourable treatment of 
a privative clause: the restrictive interpretation of such provisions has a long 
history in English law. 39 
The revolutionary nature of the decision of the House of Lords is instead to 
be found in the broad assessment of when a decision may been made in 
excess of statutory jurisdiction. Prior to Anisminic the validity of a decision 
made under statutory authority depended upon whether the deciding body had 
jurisdiction to enter into the inquiry.40 The approach taken by Lord Reid, 
33 See text at n. 197 - 207. 
34 (1933) 60 IA 354, 361. 
35 R v. Medical Appeal Tribunal, exp. Gilmore [ 1957) QB 574, 586 per Lord Denning 
MR: "If tribunals were at liberty to exceed their jurisdiction without check by the court, the 
rule of law would be at an end." 
36 See below n. 138. 
37 [1969) 2 AC 147. 
38 Bulk Gas Users Group v. Attorney-General [1983) NZLR 129, 133; In re Racal 
Communications Ltd. [1981) AC 374, 382G. 
39 For example, Smith 's Case (1670) 1 Vent. 66. 
40 R v. Bolton (1841) I QB 66. 
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subsequently described as "a strain on the language used"41 was rather more 
extensive:42 
"[T]here are many cases where, although the tribunal had jurisdiction to 
enter into the inquiry, it has done or failed to do something in the course 
of its inquiry that its decision is a nullity. It may have given its decision 
in bad faith . It may have made a decision which it had no power to 
make. It may have failed in the course of its inquiry to comply with the 
requirements of natural justice. It m::!y in perfect good faith have 
misconstrued the provisions giving it power to act so that it failed to 
deal with the question remitted to it and decided some question which 
was not remitted to it. It may have refused to take into account 
something which it was required to take into account. Or it may have 
based its decision on some matter which, under the provisions setting it 
up, it had no right to take into account. I do not intend this list to be 
exhaustive." 
It would seem clear the definition of jurisdiction is so broad as to pennit of 
review in almost any instance.43 The unpredictability and potential for 
vagueness of such an approach has been strongly criticised.44 It has further 
been suggested, both by members of the judiciary45 and elsewhere,46 that it 
allows for substantial judicial manipulation. 
The effect of the privative provision contained in section 4( 4) of the Foreign 
Compensation Act 1950 (UK) would appear to have been largely if not 
wholly removed. Although reference was made to the authority of the 
Foreign Compensation Commission to make errors within its jurisdiction,47 it 
is difficult to conceive of an error which could not conceivably satisfy such a 
broad definition of the term.48 It would thus seem, given that review is of 
course limited to questions of law, that privative provisions may be deprived 
of most if not all of their effect.49 Certainly it is difficult not to accept that the 
interpretation reached by the majority in Anisminic was quite contrary to 
41Above n. 13, 44. 
42 Above n. 37, 171. 
43 D M Gordon "What did the Anisminic case decide?" ( 1971 ) 34 MLR 1, 6. 
44 JA SmjlJie "Privative Clauses and Judicial Review" [ 198 I] NZU 274, 274. 
45 Pearlman v. Keepers and Governors of Harrow School [1979] I QB 57, 70, per Lord 
Denning MR: "So fine is the distinction that in truth the High Court has a choice before it 
whether to interfere .... " 
46 H W McLauchlan "Judicial Review of Adminjstrative Interpretations of Law: How much 
formalism can we reasonably bear?" ( 1986) 36 UTU 343, 369 - 370: Tests for jurisdiction 
are "little more than a rhetorical flourish where a court has otherwise made up its mind to 
revise an administrative decision." 
47 Above n. 8, 171 (per Lord Reid), 195 (Lord Pearce). 
48 As was noted in the dissenting judgment of Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, above n. 42, 
I 87- I 88 . See also H W R Wade "Constitutional and Administrative Aspects of the 
Anisminic Case" (1969) 85 LQR 198, 211 and BC Gould "Anisminic and jurisdictional 
review" [1970] PL 358, 361. 
49 Above n. 13, 727 
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legislative intent,50 despite Lord Wilberforce's "brave"51 contention to the 
contrary. 52 
The abandonment of jurisdictional review was proposed in the later judgment 
of Lord Denning MR in Pearlman v. Keepers and Governors of Harrow 
School, who, having noted the fineness of the distinction, suggested that 
review be available for any error of law "on which the decision of the case 
depends", 53 Whilst it is possible that the rP.quirement of dependence leaves 
some scope for the operation of privative provhions, it is not unreasonable to 
suggest that the intended function of such provisions is completely 
frustrated. 54 
Although the approach of Lord Denning MR was not followed by either of 
the other members of the Court of Appeal, it would appear to have been 
accepted by Lord Diplock three years later in In re Racal Communications 
Ltd.55 Lord Diplock held that the presumption in favour of review, upon 
which the restrictive interpretation of privative provisions was based, applied 
only to the decisions of administrative tribunals and authorities and not to 
courts of law.56 Although the approach was followed only by one other 
member of the court,57 it would appear to have been adopted unanimously by 
the House of Lords in O'Reilly v. Mackman. 58 
The Privy Council has expressly rejected the abandonment proposed in 
Pearlman.59 The most recent Court of Appeal decision in the area of privative 
provisions, Bulk Gas Users Group v. Attorney-General, would however 
appear to follow Lord Diplock's reasoning, distinguishing the Pricy Council 
ruling on the basis of the "special considerations" and "legislative policy" 
related to industrial courts.60 
Although the abandonment of the jurisdictional approach to review removes 
much of the obscurity from review proceedings, the problem of legislative 
intent becomes similarly more apparent. Although Lord Diplock gave literal 
50 Wade, above n. 48, 201. 
51 Above n. 13, 728. 
52 [1969) 2 AC 147, 208 . 
53 Above n. 48, 70. 
54 H WR Wade, "Anisminic ad Infinitum" (1979) 95 LQR 163, 166. 
55 [1981) AC 374, 378. Note, however, Lord Diplock's assertion , following his article 
"Judicial Review Reviewed" (1974) 33 CU 233, 243, at 383 that the distinction between 
jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional errors of Jaw had "for practical purposes" been abolished 
in Anisminic. 
56 [1981) AC 374, 382. 
57 Above n. 59, 391 per Lord Keith of Kinkel. 
58 [1983) 2 AC 237, 277. 
59 South East Asia Fire Bricks Sdn. Bhd. v. Non-metallic Mineral Products Manufacturing 
Employees Union [198 l] AC 363, 370. 
60 [1983) NZLR 129, 133. 
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application to the "unqualified language" of the statute in Racal in determining 
the authority of an inferior court,61 it is not clear that the "clear words" 
required to preclude review of an administrative body exist.62 As was noted 
by Sir Thaddeus McCarthy in Bulk Gas, the prospect of review for any error 
of law "raises important questions of judicial policy relating to the proper 
boundaries of judicial and legislative functions within the State. "63 
A further criticism of Lord Diplock's appro~ch is that it merely replaces the 
obscure test of jurisdiction with equally difficult determinations of the 
distinction between administrative authorities and inferior courts64 and of the 
existence of error of law. The difficulty of the former was made clear in 
Attorney-General v. British Broadcasting Corporation,65 while the latter may 
permit considerable expansion of review through such developments as the 
classification of mistake of fact as a reviewable error of law.66 
It is thus clear that the judicial interpretation of privative provisions is 
extremely flexible and may, in its apparent inconsistency and complexity, 
appear to reflect less a move towards systematic rules of interpretation than an 
arguably sophist defence67 of the authority of the courts to review where they 
see fit, regardless of the presence of a privative provision.68 
61 [1981] AC 374, 380 . 
62 R S French "The Rise and Rise of Judicial Review" (1993) 23 UWALR 120, 123. 
6 oven. 63 139. Note also the reference to unspecified limits on the authority of the 
legislature to preclude review in the judgment of Cooke J [1983] NZLR 129, 136. 
64 Note that Lord Diplock did not exclude inferior courts in the affirmation in O'Reilly 
[ 1983] 2 AC 237, 278 of his approach in Racal. 
65 [1981] AC 303. As an illustration of the difficulty, note the comment by JA Smillie 
(above n. 44, 277) that the Foreign Compensation Commission had been described as an 
administrative tribunal by Lord Diplock 1981] AC 374, 382, and as "a truly judicial body" 
by Lord Denning MR in R v. Secretary of State, ex parte Ostler [1977] QB 122, 135. 
66 Daganayasi v. Minister of Immigration [1980] 2 NZLR 130, 147 - 148. 
67 Above n. 49 . 
68 J Beatson "The scope of judicial review for errors of law" (1984) 4 OJLS 22, 22: "There 
is increasing evidence that such strains are caused by the deliberate manipulation of the 
doctrine [of ultra vires] in order to achieve what they see as the desirable amount of 
intervention." 
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B Privative Enactments in New 'Zealand Law 
There are currently at least forty-one privative provisions in force in New 
Zealand law, 69 of which almost one third have been enacted in the past 
decade. Given the improbability of effectual interpretation it is not 
unreasonable to suggest that they are now of limited interest. 70 The surprising 
number of extant provisions, and particl!l::uly of provisions enacted since 
1984, together with the broad range of activities to which they relate, would 
appear to indicate otherwise. Further reason may be found in the favourable 
interpretation accorded certain provisions by the courts, 71 and also by the 
continued judicial recognition of the at least theoretical possibility of effective 
statutory preclusion of review regardless of such context.72 
There would thus appear to be strong justification for an examination of 
current provisions, particularly in relation to the nature of the bodies and 
decisions to which they apply, to the justifications which may be made for 
such provisions, and to their probable or actual judicial interpretation. The 
particular phrasing of the provisions, which has proved largely irrelevant in 
terms of their legal effect,73 will not be considered except where it is of 
particular interest. 
In addition to the privative prov1s10ns identified, a number of other 
provisions intended to restrict review in very similar areas will be considered 
by way of contrast.74 
The largest group of current provisions are those which concern the exercise 
of statutory authority by specified courts. Whilst a number of these involve 
the High Court,75 Justices of the Peace,76 and the courts of Niue and 
69 See Appendix I. The number given is the result of analysing the provisions found in the 
STATUS statute database by a number of searches for standard privative formulae. See 
above n. 25 as to the accuracy of such searches. 
70 Above n. 28, 63 . 
7I Bulk Gas Users Group v. Attorney-General [1983) NZLR 129; South East Asia Fire 
Bricks Sdn. Bhd. v. Non-metallic Mineral Products Manufacturing Employees Union 
[1981) AC 363; In re Racal Communications Ltd [1981) AC 374. 
72 Anisminic v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969) 2 AC 147, 207; Bulk Gas 
Users Group v. Attorney-General [1983) NZLR 129, 136 "It is generally accepted ... that 
Parliament can empower an administrative tribunal to determine some questions of law, 
typically questions of statutory interpretation, conclusively. I will assume that to be so - at 
least within limits that need not here be explored." Note, however, the increasing reserve of 
the New Zealand Court of Appeal in comparison to Attorney-Gerneral v. Car Haulaways 
(NZ) Ltd [1974] 2 NZLR 331,340. 
73 PP Craig, Administrative Law (2ed Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1989), 438. 
74 See Appendix II. 
75 Electoral Act 1956, s.168. 
76 Pawnbrokers Act 1908, s. 41. 
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Australia,77 the majority are related to the decisions of the District Court.78 
Such provisions would appear to assuage many of the concerns expressed 
over the "unlawful" nature of preclusion in so far as the decision remains 
within the court system, albeit subject to certain limits. 
The exercise of unreviewable authority by a court rather than an 
administrative authority is arguably less objectionable for two reasons: firstly, 
the rule of law is largely maintained, and sct:ondly, the courts are less likely, 
by reason of their nature, visibility, and duty to give reasons, to abuse such 
authority.79 This distinction between courts and administrative authorities has 
been recognised both by the House of Lords80 and by the New Zealand Court 
of Appeal, 81 and it would therefore seem probable that such provisions are 
likely to be accorded favourable interpretation, as has occurred on at least one 
occasion.82 
There is moreover substantial practical appeal in the limitation of review 
proceedings and the consequent reductions in cost and delay which would 
seem likely in some instances to frustrate the purpose of the legislation 
entirely.83 
However, there remains one substantial cause for doubt as to the necessity of 
such provisions: that of the likelihood, at least in part for the reasons which 
have been given, that the courts would in such instances exercise their 
discretion against review.84 Whilst it is clear that review of the decisions of 
District Courts and more frequently of those of Justices of the Peace would 
be granted in extreme cases, such as patent absurdity, it would seem 
improbable that a privative provision could prevent review in such 
circumstances. Where the decisions of the High Court and particularly those 
77 Niue Act 1966, s. 25 and Judicature Act 1908, s. 56N. 
78 Of fifteen such provisions identified, nine are related to decisions of the District Court . 
79 "[T]he least dangerous branch of government" Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist: A 
Commentary on the Constitution of the United States (Modern Library, New York, 1961 ), 
77. 
80 In re Racal Communications Ltd [1981] AC 374, 382 - 383 per Lord Diplock. 
81 Bulk Gas Users Group v. Attorney-General [1983] NZLR 129, 135 per Cooke J. 
82 In Single v. District Court (Unreported, 23 August 1993, High Court, Napier Registry 
CP 22/93) Justice Neazor interpreted s. 108 of the Local Elections and Polls Act 1976 to 
preclude review, noting the "wide jurisdiction" of the District Court. 
83 Such proceedings are likely to favour those who have the time or money to enter into 
them over those who do not. (D Pearce, "Judicial Review of Tribunal Decisions: the Need 
for Restraint", (1981 ) 12 Federal LR 167). An example of such effects frustrating the 
purpose of the legislation may perhaps be found in the Machinery Act 1950. The Act is 
based upon nineteenth century industrial safety enactments intended to permit wealthy 
factory owners to be penalised. 
84 Above n. 28, 20. 
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of the courts of other jurisdictions are concerned, review will almost certainly 
not be granted. 85 
The decisions of a number of arguably quasi-judicial bodies are also subject 
to privative provisions, ranging from specialised courts such as the 
Employment Court86 to bodies such as the Office of the Ombudsman. 87 The 
former provision is of particular interest as in addition to including substantial 
appeal rights, the legislation itself defines the circumstances in which the 
Court is without jurisdiction, following the approach of the courts prior to 
Anisminic.88 Similar provision was made in the Labour Relations Act 1987.89 
Thus although industrial relations courts have typically enjoyed substantial 
judicial deference,90 there would seem to be a consistent effort to safeguard 
that position by statute. 
It is also interesting that the privative provision found in the Ombudsman 
Act91 does not apply to the actions of the Ombudsman under the Official 
Information Act. The reason for the distinction would appear to be the 
passage of seven years between the two acts: the Committee on Official 
Information suggested that section 25 was of a type "not now normally used 
in legislation. "92 
The Official Information Act 1982 does however retain the exhaustion 
provision found in the Ombudsman Act.93 Provisions of this type are fairly 
common in tribunal legislation,94 as are conclusive evidence provisions.95 
The intended function of such provisions would appear to be the isolation of 
the bodies to which they relate from the courts. Such protection may be 
justified for reasons of substance, such as the specialist nature of employment 
85 Jn re Racal Communications Ltd. [1981] AC 374, 384. 
86 Employment Contracts Act 1990, s. I 04. 
87 Ombudsman Act 1975, s. 25 . 
88 See above n. 41. 
89 Sections 279(6) and 279(7). 
90 For example, Bulk Gas Users Group v. Attorney-General [1983] NZLR 129, 133. 
91 Above n. 88. 
92 Towards Open Government: Supplementary Report (Government Printer, Wellington, 
1981), 12. 
93 Section 34. 
94 For example, the Casino Control Act 1990 s. 98 and the Sale of Liquor Act 1989, s. 
148. 
95 This would seem particularly true in the area of censorship: see the Indecent Publications 
Act 1963, s. 12 and the Video Recordings Act 1987, s. 29, perhaps reflecting the 
specialised but lay nature of the decisions of such bodies. 
L .v LI f:.!A/ I y 
l/11.., l"UHIA ur~, ER~i,Y OF \, , .. [ . 
-.L, lt.,t.,lt,;~, 
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law,96 for reasons of procedure,97 or in the case of the Ombudsman Act, for 
reason of the potentially controversial nature of decisions.98 
The probability of favourable interpretation of such provisions in the courts is 
likely to depend upon the extent to which the body in question resembles a 
court99 and also upon the particular nature of the decisions which it makes. 
On this basis the probability of review of the decisions of the Employment 
CourtIOO (even disregarding the presence of extensive statutory appeal 
provisions) is substantially smaller than review of the decisions of the 
Ombudsman. IOI 
Again, it would seem clear that the extent to which a privative clause would 
receive favourable interpretation in the courts is largely a reflection of the 
courts' degree of deference to the body to which it relates rather than a 
response to the provision itself. 
Where provisions related to the conduct of international relations are 
concerned, 102 the position is again complex. Whilst such matters fall within 
the prerogative, it would seem clear that that status does not of itself preclude 
review. 103 What may do so, however, is the likelihood that decisions taken in 
relation to such matters may involve the development and application of 
government policy and the consideration of issues ill-suited to court 
examination. 104 The fact that the provisions relate to the statutory authority of 
a Minister would further indicate a strong policy content. There would thus 
appear to reasonable justification for such enactments. 
As is the case in other areas, however, the courts would seem very likely to 
place considerable restrictions on review proceedings for precisely these 
96 South East Asia Fire Bricks Sdn Bhd. v. Non-metallic Mineral Products Manufacturing 
Employees Union [1981] AC 363,373. 
97 Although note the improbability of review for want of form. 
98 Above n. 54, 8: "[The courts would have] to rule on matters with strong political and 
policy implications. That is not a normal or traditional function of the courts of New 
2.ealand." 
99 "Perhaps an implication [of authority to determine questions of law conclusively] might 
be established a little more readily in the case of a tribunal whose function and status more 
closely resembled that of a court" Bulk Gas Users Group v. Attorney-General [ 1983] NZLR 
129, 136 per Cooke J. 
1 OO Above n. 56. 
IOI For example, review was permitted in Commissioner of Police v. Ombudsman [1985] 
I NZLR 578, Justice Jeffries having noted that the office of Ombudsman is not one which 
requires legal qualifications. 
I02 For example, the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1977, s. 21 and the 
Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act 1968, s. 20(5). 
I03 Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, 411 
and Burt v. Governor-General [1992] 3 NZLR 672,678. 
104 C Walker "Review of the prerogative: the remaining issues" [ 1987] PL 62, 67 suggests 
that the distinction is of little effect. For an analysis of the procedural requirements of 
review see GD S Taylor "The Limits of Judicial Review" ( 1986) 12 NZULR 178. 
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reasons. 105 Nevertheless, where individual rights are the pnmary 
consideration review may be granted more readily .106 One such issue may be 
the grant of visas, 107 in relation to which the English Court of Appeal granted 
review in R v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex 
p Everett. 108 
The probable exercise of judicial discretion would also seem likely to render 
the privative enactments contained in the Ntw Zealand Security Intelligence 
Service Act 1969109 similarly pointless. 11 o Whilst there is reason for 
considerable concern where such matters are involved, given the potentially 
grave consequences of abuse, 111 the British judiciary have in the past 
indicated a reluctance to intervene. The decision of the House of Lords in 
Secretary of State for Defence v. Guardian Newpapers Ltd. that a plea of 
national security must be substantiated may indicate some change in judicial 
attitudes.112 
Conclusive evidence provisions are also employed in international relations 
statutes 11 3 and security legislationll4. The former would appear to reflect 
consideration of the competence of the courts to determine the existence of a 
state of affairs which involves the conduct of foreign relations. 115 The latter 
would seem principally to be concerned with maintaining confidentiality in 
court proceedings.116 
Although the privative provision relating to the Serious Fraud Office is 
phrased in similar terms to the security provisions discussed, it is unlikely to 
I05 Cameron v. Minister of Foreign Affairs Unreported, 9 August 1990, Court of Appeal, 
CA 11/90. 
106 Burt v. Governor-General [1992] 3 NZLR 672,679 & 683. 
107 Immigration Act 1987, s. 10. 
IOS [1989] QB 811. 
I 09 Sections 4A & 20. It is of interest that the latter section, which is related to the actions 
of the Commissioner for Security Appeals, was amended by the NZSIS Amendment Act 
1977 to allow review for want of jurisdiction. 
l lO Above n. 28, 29: "[Security and defence are] largely under the prerogative in which no 
Court has intervened, or is considered likely to intervene, other than in personnel matters." 
111 Liversidge v. Anderson [1942] AC 206, 244 per Lord Atkin. See also JM Hlophe 
"South African ouster clauses - meaning and effect" (1986) 45 CU 369 discussing Hurley 
v. Minister of Law [1985] 4 SA 709 (D) and a number of oppressive state security 
provisions. 
l l2 [1985] AC 339. 
113 Consular Privileges and Immunities Act 1971, s. 9. 
11 4 New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act 1969, s. 4A(7). 
115 Although note the practice of the New Zealand government of not making conclusive 
statements in such areas: Attorney-General for Fiji v. Robt Jones House Ltd [1989] 2 
NZLR 69, 75. 
l 16 "Where it is necessary to prove in any proceedings that any person was acting at any 
time pursuant to an interception warrant, it shall not be necessary to produce the warrant to 
the Court, but a certificate by the Attorney-General as to any matters specified in the 
warrant shall be conclusive evidence as to all such matters so certified." 
15 
• 
[I 
• 
receive similarly favourable treatment. 117 Whilst there is a superficial 
resemblance in the need for confidentiality in both areas, it would seem clear 
that the courts are not prepared to intervene extensively in matters of national 
security. Where commercial sensitivity is concerned, the courts would seem 
likely to intervene in the confidence that such demands may be accommodated 
by procedural flexibility .118 
A further group of provisions which would appear to be rendered 
superfluous by judicial discretion are those purporting to preclude review for 
want of form. Although such clauses were among the earliest and most useful 
of privative provisions, their effect is now expressly provided for by section 
5 of the Judicature Amendment Act 1977. 119 Such provisions, which are 
concerned with actions of the District Court 120 and of various authorities such 
as the Ombudsman121 and the Race Relations Conciliator, 122 would appear to 
be intended as recognition of the particular status of the body concerned. The 
intended effect of such provisions would seem likely to be to allow for 
procedural flexibility. 
However, although many of the provisions identified would appear to be 
rendered largely if not wholly unnecessary through the exercise of judicial 
discretion, there are a number for which this is not the case. Most commonly 
the provision relates to statutory authority conferred upon a Minister, and is 
for that reason less likely to be reviewed.123 Such restraint would seem more 
likely to be a reflection of the potentially high policy content in such 
decisions. For the same reason, deference would seem even more likely 
where the power concerned is exercised by Order in Council. 124 
A further group of very recent clauses relate to transitional provisions. The 
most recent relates to the decisions of the Maori Land Court and as such 
would seem likely to be followed, although again on the basis of the nature of 
I I 7 Serious Fraud Office Act 1990, s. 20 . 
118 R v. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, exp Datafin Pie [ 1987) QB 815, 842. 
119 "On an application for review in relation to a statutory power of decision , where the 
sole ground of relief established is a defect in form or a technical irregularity , if the Court 
finds that no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has occurred, it may refuse relief 
and, where the decision has already been made, may make an order validating the decision, 
notwithstanding the defect or irregularity, to have effect from such time and on such terms 
as the Court thinks fit." 
120 For example, the District Courts Act 194 7, s.64, the Summary Proceedings Act 1957, 
s. 204 and, surprisingly given the passage of the Judicature Amendment Act in 1972, the 
Children, Young Persons and their Families Act 1989, s. 440. 
121 Above n. 54. 
122 Section 19, Race Relations Act 1971. 
123 Padfield v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968) AC 997. An example of 
such a section may be found in the Public Bodies Leases Act 1969, s. 3. 
124 Marketing Act 1936, s. 23 . 
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the body concerned rather than the presence of the privative clause. 125 Other 
provisions relating to the decisions of a Minister126 and of various 
administrative decisionrnakers 127 would seem less likely to receive favourable 
interpretation in the courts. Whilst the transitional nature of the provisions 
may indicate that their intent is to ensure an uninterrupted passage from one 
statutory regime to another, such practical requirements are likely to be 
considered by the courts to be better accom."!l.odated by choice of procedure 
and remedy than through restriction of review. 12!s 
The approach of the courts may be more favourable in regard to section 9 of 
the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1993, as it is in 
effect a decision of the legislature itself rather than an administrative decision 
in any normal sense, suggesting that review would be strongly restricted.129 
It may further be suggested that the Act indicates a legislative policy of the 
type referred to in Bulk Gas Users Group. 130 It would also seem wholly 
anathematic to the Act to find exceptions to the settlement which it 
implements, and furthermore the settlement itself would seem particularly ill-
suited to court determination. 131 The courts have furthermore indicated a 
strong preference to allow negotiated settlements of Treaty claims to stand. 132 
In addition to the theoretical desirability or otherwise of the provisions 
identified, it is perhaps helpful to consider their continuing utility. Whilst, as 
has been noted, privative provisions have continued to be enacted, thirty-
three of the provisions currently in force are more than ten years old. Of these 
only one has been considered in a case reported in the New Zealand Law 
Reports in the past thirty years. No extant provision has ever been reported in 
the ten years since the New Zealand Administrative Reports began to report 
cases. 133 It may also be argued that the five recent transitional provisions are 
of limited enduring interest. 
It would thus seem that a number of privative provisions are without 
justification and that the justifications which can be made are well served by 
!25 Maori Land Act Te Ture Whenua Maori 1993, s. 348. 
I 26 Resource Management Act 1991, s. 423. 
127 Resource Management Act 1991, ss. 391 and 422 and the Fisheries Act 1983 , s. 
28ZGA (inserted by the Fisheries Amendment Act (no. 3) 1992). 
128 Above, n. 115. 
129 R v. Secretary of State for the Environment, exp. Hammersmith and Fulham London 
Borough Council [1991] 1 AC 521,597. 
130 Bulk Gas Users Group v. Attorney-General [1983] 129, 133. Note, however, that such 
a "policy" was found in relation to an employment court rather than an administrative body. 
131 See Taylor, above n. 50. 
132 New Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641 , 719. 
l 33 Two cases have been reported since 1984, both related to legislation which has since 
been repealed. 
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judicial discretion. Further, many of the prov1s10ns identified are now 
obsolescent, and effectual interpretation of even recent provisions would 
seem at best uncertain.134 
134 Law Commission (UK) Working Paper No. 40, Remedies in Administrative Law, 117. 
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ID THE DIRECTION OF REFORM 
It has been noted that the enactment and interpretation of privative provisions 
is an element of the process of compromise inherent in the administration of 
government. However, as has been seen in the actions of both the courts and 
the legislature, neither the extent of the current compromise nor the rational 
justification for it are clear. 
One means by which the respective positions of the legislature and the courts 
might be made more clearly apparent is through the hypothetical assignment 
of complete responsibility to one body to the exclusion of the other by 
according privative provisions either literal effect or no effect whatsoever. 
Although such extreme positions are not, as will be seen, desirable, it is 
submitted that they provide a clear indication of the factors which must be 
considered in establishing the necessary degree of compromise. 
It is clear that these factors may be broadly categorised as firstly, the 
substantive elements of the constitutional positions of Parliament and the 
courts, and secondly the procedural or functional qualities which each 
demonstrates as a decision-making body. It is submitted that through the 
examination of these categories in each hypothesis an appropriate balance 
between the demands of administration and of supervision may be found. 
A Should Privative Provisions be Disregarded? 
1 Constitutional considerations 
The principle of a single general court system determining the legality of the 
actions of both individuals and authorities has long been held to be a tenet of 
English constitutional law, 135 and arguably unalterable for that reason. 136 In 
the exercise of that function the courts may be seen to provide the ultimate 
safeguard for the fundamental elements of the legal system.137 
135 AV Dicey The Law of the Constitution (!Oed 1959) (ed EC S Wade) 193 - 195. 
136 H W R Wade, Constitutional Fundamentals (Stevens, London, 1981 ), 66 and R B 
Cooke "The struggle for simplicity in administrative law" in Judicial Review of 
Administrative Action in the 1980s M. Taggart (ed.) (Auckland 1986, Oxford/Legal 
Research Foundation), 1, 10: "[W]e are on the brink of open recognition of a fundamental 
rule of our mainly unwritten constitution, namely that determination of questions of law is 
the ultimate responsibility of the Courts of general jurisdiction." 
137 Fraser v. State Services Commission [1984) 1 NZLR 116 per Cooke J: "it is arguable 
that some common law rights go so deep that even Parliament cannot be accepted by the 
courts to have destroyed them." See also A Dicey The law of the Constitution ed. EC S 
Wade (lOed 1959) and, very similarly Cooke, above n. 5, 10. 
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In this context the effect of a privative provision is not only the protection of 
decisions which are "wrong", in the sense that they differ from the courts' 
authoritative interpretation of law, 138 it is also an attempt to avoid the rule of 
law by removing the action to which the provision relates from the overview 
of the courts. 139 
The principal argument in favour of complete judicial disregard for privative 
provisions is thus appealing in its simplicity: there is a very real sense of 
absurdity in conferring limited authority by statute and in the same enactment 
permitting the empowered body or individual to breach those limitations.14-0 
However, the authority claimed for the courts would appear predicated on the 
contention that the ultimate determination of legality must in all instances rest 
with the courts. Whilst it is an important and complex contention of long 
standing, it is submitted that it provides neither an accurate description of the 
role of the courts nor a viable basis for administrative law. 
It would seem clear that many government actions involve determinations of 
law, fact and policy. Many such actions may be subjected to review. Some, 
except perhaps in extraordinary circumstances, cannot, and have been 
recognised as such by the courts in the exercise of their discretion. It would 
however appear absurd to contend that such actions are either illegal or 
beyond the law, or that they are uncontrolled. It would seem reasonable to 
suggest that such actions are in fact overseen by other elements of 
government, including the legislature itself. 141 Although responsibility to 
Parliament has been expressly rejected as a substitute for review by at least 
one eminent member of the Englishjudiciary, 142 review has been held to be 
severely restricted and possibly barred altogether by an express, rather than 
implicit, requirement of parliamentary approval. 143 
138 Hon. R B Cooke, "Administrative Law: the Vanishing Sphinx" [ 1975] NZU 529, 
530. See also H WR Wade above n. 48, 200 - 201. 
139 R v. Medical Appeal Tribunal, exp. Gilmore [1957] 1 QB 574, 586 per Denning U . 
140 "What would be the point of defining by statute the limit of a tribunal's powers if, by 
means of a clause inserted in the instrument of definition, those limits could safely be 
passed?" Anisminic v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147, 208 per 
Lord Wilberforce. 
141 M Aronson & N Franklin, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (2ed Law Book, 
Sydney, 1987), 671. 
142 "[It is not] a sufficient answer to say that judicial review of the actions of officers or 
departments of central government is unnecessary because they are accountable to 
Parliament for the way they carry out their functions ." Inland Revenue Commissioners v. 
National Federation of Self-Employed & Small Businesses Ltd. [1982] A.C. 617, 644. 
Note, however, the differing view taken by the Supreme Court of Canada in Toronto 
Newspaper Guild v. Globe Printing Co. [1953] 3 DLR 561,573. 
143 R v. Secretary of State for the Environment, exp. Hammersmith and Fulham London 
Borough Council [1991] I AC 521,597. 
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While the limitations of direct parliamentary control are clear, 144 it is 
undeniable that legislation empowering administrative bodies is not 
interpreted by the courts alone. Whilst interpretations reached by other bodies 
may be considered an inadequate assurance of legality, 145 it is not 
unreasonable to suggest that in some instances the interpretation of law 
reached by the courts is not necessarily superior to that reached by the body 
under review itself146 or where appropriate hy a supervisory authority other 
than the courts.147 
The enactment of a privative provision may thus be considered to be an 
implicit legislative undertaking that legality of the actions to which it relates 
will be ensured by legislative or executive control. 148 Such provisions may 
therefore be regarded not as an abandonment of legality but rather as the 
statutory expression of a choice between two potentially differing 
interpretations of the law .149 It would also seem clear that in some instances 
there is no single correct interpretation, as has been noted Justice Dickson of 
the Supreme Court of Canada: "The ambiguity of [section] 102(3)(a) is 
acknowledged and undoubted. There is no interpretation which can be said to 
be 'right."' 150 
It may further be suggested that by continuing to enact privative provisions 
despite the restrictive interpretation accorded them the legislature has 
recognised the fundamental nature of review and accepted that restriction. 151 
In light of the apparently ineffectual interpretation accorded many such 
provisions, it may be suggested that privative clauses are inherently 
obsolescent. 152 
144 G L Peiris "Statutory Exclusion of Judicial Review in Australian, Canadian and New 
Zealand Law" (1982) PL 451,464. 
145 Above n. 10, 65. 
146 P C Weiler "Judges and Administrators: an issue in constitutional policy" in 
Proceedings of the Administrative Law Conference (Faculty of Law, University of British 
Columbia, Vancouver, 1979), 383. It is of course important not to confuse the action of a 
statutory authority in carrying out its function as a whole with the determination of the 
extent of its powers, as is noted in M Burrowes, "Privative and Time Clauses" 
(Unpublished LLM Research Paper, Victoria University, Wellington, 1981) 60. 
147 C Harlow & R Rawlings Law and Administration (Weidenfield and Nicolson, London, 
1984), 97 - 98. 
148 B Laskin "Certiorari to Labour Boards: The apparent futility of privative clauses" 
(1952) 30 Can. Bar Rev. 986, 1000. 
149 pp Craig Administrative Law (2ed Sweet and Maxwell, 1989), 438. 
150 Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor 
Corporation [1979) 2 SCR 227, 237. 
151 Above n. 55, 239. 
152 A Hutchinson "The Rise and Ruse of Administrative Law and Scholarship" (1985) 48 
MLR 293, 314, has described privative clauses as the legislative equivalent of "what the 
Maginot Line was to military tactics ... And now it has suffered the same fate ." 
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There would, however, appear to be a number of more probable explanations 
for the continued enactment of potentially ineffectual provisions.153 Firstly, it 
may be unreasonable to assume informed acceptance of the approach taken in 
the courts. Privative enactments are, as has been noted, typically phrased in 
unequivocal terms which may make their restrictive interpretation seem highly 
improbable to Members of Parliament.154 Further, the means by which the 
legislature might seek to challenge such interpretations is not clear, given that 
extremely strong statutory provisions have pn,ved ineffectual. 155 It would 
also seem clear, judging by the fierce and ultimately effective opposition to 
attempts to strengthen the Foreign Compensation Act 1950 (UK) in response 
to Anisminic, that such reaction may be politically impossible.156 
A further ground upon which the courts might base a refusal to implement 
privative provisions may be found in section 27(2) of the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act 1990: 
"Every person whose rights, obligations or interests protected or 
recognised by law have been affected by a determination of any tribunal 
or other public authority has the right to apply, in accordance with law, 
for judicial review of that determination." 
The restrictive interpretation of privative clauses may arguably be required by 
section 6 of the Act: "Wherever an enactment can be given a meaning that is 
consistent with the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights, that 
meaning shall be preferred to any other meaning." 157 
Section 4, which requires that other enactments may not be held invalid 
simply by reason of the Act, 158 would however appear to prevent such an 
approach. It would seem difficult in most instances to infer any ambiguity 
from privative provisions, particularly given that interpretations applied under 
153 See text at n. 33. 
l54 Above n.149, 439, noting that the "bulk of legislators are laymen [sic]." 
I 55 Above n. 62. 
156 Above n. 13, 728 - 729. 
l57 W G Liddell, "Administrative Law Review" [1990) NZ Recent LRev 279,293. For a 
more extensive discussion of the effect of the Act on judicial review in general, see M 
Chen "Judicial review of state-owned enterprises at the crossroads" (1994) 24 VUWLR 51, 
75 and J N Hay "Section 27 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, The Right to 
Justice: Something Old, Something New" (Unpublished LLM Research Paper, Victoria 
University of Wellington, 1991), 29 - 35. 
Note that reference has been made to the Act in the course of Parliamentary debate on 
privative enactments. For example NZPD vol. 532, 12832 4 December 1992 (Treaty of 
Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992) and, in a less extraordinary case, NZPD 
vol. 532, 12989 19 December 1992 (Finance Bill (No. 6) 1992 (inserts s. 28ZGA Fisheries 
Act)). See below n. I 66. 
158 "No court shall, in relation to any enactment (whether passed or made before or after the 
commencement of this Bill of Rights), - (a) Hold any provision of the enactment to be 
impliedly repealed or revoked, or in any way to be invalid or ineffective; or (b) Decline to 
apply any provision of the enactment - by reason only that the provision is inconsistent 
with any provision of this Bill of Rights." 
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section 6 must be reasonable. 159 It is possible that the past treatment of 
privative provisions may be held to create such an ambiguity. 
A further problem may arise from the inclusion of the phrase "in accordance 
with law" in section 27(2), which could reasonably be interpreted to include 
the terms of privative enactments. I 60 There may also be some objection to 
establishing a broad power to disregard privative enactments on the 
declaratory legislation, 16 1 although this has not proved an obstacle to 
innovative application of the Act in other areas. 102 
The extent to which a privative clause might be regarded by the courts as a 
"reasonable [limit] prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a 
free and democratic society" 163 and so escape restriction under the Act would 
also seem limited given the fundamental importance accorded the right to 
review .164 The suggestion that the courts should accord greater weight to the 
legislative expression of the will of a "democratic society" would seem 
unlikely to be followed, given that such recognition would presumably entail 
unrestricted application of privative provisions. 165 
It would seem clear however that the Attorney-General considers that the 
restriction created by privative provisions either is capable of such 
justification or does not infringe the Act. 166 
159 Ministry of Transport v. Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260,272. 
!60 Note the explanation of s. 27(2) given in "A Bill of Rights for New Zealand" (White 
Paper, 1985), 10.172, although note that had the Act been enacted as superior legislation as 
was proposed many privative provisions might be implicitly repealed. 
l 6 l New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s. 2: "The rights and freedoms contained in this 
Bill of Rights are affirmed." 
162 For example, the decision of Cooke P. in Baigent Estate v. Attorney-Gene ral 
Unreported, 29 July 1994, Court of Appeal , CA 207/93, 11 : "the long title shows that, in 
affirming the rights and freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights , the Act requires 
development of the law when necessary. Such a measure is not to be approached as if it did 
no more than preserve the status quo." 
163 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s. 5. 
164 See text at n. 35, above. Canadian experience would suggest that the section would be 
particularly difficult to satisfy where legal rights are concerned. (P Monahan, Politics and 
the Constitution: the Charter, Federalism and the Supreme Court of Canada (Carswell , 
Toronto 1987), 41 - 42. ) 
165 T G Ison "The Sovereignty of the Judiciary" (1986) l O Adelaide LR I , 18. 
166 For example, in the debate on the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement 
Bill 1992, the Rt. Hon. D Lange MP suggested that the Attorney-General was required to 
notify the House under s. 7 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 . The Attorney-
General stated that such notification was not required as, if the Bill did breach any of the 
provisions of the Act, s.5 of the Act applied (NZPD vol. 532, 12832 & 12840, 4 
December 1992). 
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2 Functional considerations 
In addition to the less immediate benefits of equality and universality of law 
which would appear to stem from the unrestricted availability of review, there 
are significant practical reasons for disregard of privative provisions. These 
include the specialised legal skills which the courts are able to apply and at the 
same time the broad perspective which a body of general jurisdiction may 
develop. 167 Furthermore there is strong justificaf on for allowing the courts 
unrestricted jurisdiction and so develop the law in a consistent and systematic 
manner. 168 Even ignoring the constitutional grounds for disregarding 
privative clauses, the approach taken by Lord Diplock in Racal that no 
administrative authority be permitted to make an unreviewable error of law 
thus has considerable appeal.169 
Although it has been seen that there are strong arguments that the 
interpretation of law by administrative bodies are in some specific instances 
superior to, or at the very least no less correct than, those determined by the 
courts, there would seem to be substantial benefit in the preservation and 
development of broad general principles which the courts may ensure. 170 It is 
however clear that the involvement of the courts in a limited role of this sort is 
not dependent upon complete disregard for privative provisions. 
A further function of review which may be enhanced through the disregard of 
privative enactments is that of remedy. Through judicial review the aggrieved 
individual may seek resolution of the grievance by the broad variety of means 
available to the reviewing court. Furthermore the administrative practice 
which caused the difficulty may be altered. The effect of privative enactments 
is necessarily to remove this right of recourse and its effect on the 
administrative process.171 
However, although there may be doubt as to the efficacy of alternative means 
for the determination of legality, it would seem clear that aggrieved 
individuals can and do make extensive use of many alternative remedies, 172 
often for reasons of the cost or delay inherent in almost all review 
167 p W Hogg, "Judicial Review: How much do we need?" (1974) 20 McGill LJ 157, 174. 
168 Above n.13, 24. 
169 Above, text accompanying n. 55 . 
170 H W Arthurs "Protection from judicial review" [ 1983) Can. Bar Rev. 277, 284 -285. 
171 Report of the McRuer Commission: Inquiry into Civil Rights No. 1 (1968) Vol. I, 
279. 
172 For example, the Office of the Ombudsman considered 3053 complaints between I July 
1992 and 31 June 1993 (Report of the Ombudsmen [1993) AJHR A. 3). 
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proceedings. 173 Furthermore, the solution produced by court intervention 
may in fact be inferior to that produced by a less confrontational process. 174 
The effect of review proceedings on administrative conduct is also arguably 
overstated.175 
A further argument in favour of the abandonment of privative provisions is 
that the legislature can and does have recourse to other means of limiting 
review, some of which have been accorded more favourable interpretations in 
the courts. 176 It would seem nonetheless that i-,rivative provisions are the 
most unambiguous legislative expression of preclusive intent. Whilst their 
use should be sparing as a consequence of the strength of such provisions, 
such clear statements should not be disregarded. 
B SHOULD ALL PRIVATIVE PROVISIONS BE ACCORDED UTERAL 
EFFECT? 
1 Constitutional considerations 
The simplest argument in favour of the literal interpretation of privative 
provisions is that such interpretation implements the clear intent of the 
legislature. 177 To do otherwise would seem to ignore the will of a 
democratically elected body. 178 Whilst it is clear that the process of statutory 
interpretation necessarily involves more than literal application, 179 it would 
seem that the meaning given many provisions is less a refinement than a 
denial of legislative intent. 180 Although the availability of review may be 
regarded as a basic requirement of our unwritten constitution, it may be 
suggested that the supremacy of a representative body is still more 
173 P W Hogg, "The Supreme Court of Canada and Administrative Law 1949 - I 971 " 
(1973) II OsgoodeHallU 187,188. 
174 H W Arthurs, "Recognising administrative law" in Proceedings of the Administrative 
Law Conference (Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, 1979) 2, 9. 
175 C Harlow "Administrative Reaction to Judicial Review" (1976) PL I 16, I 16 and H W 
Arthurs Without the Law (University of Toronto, 1985), 200. 
176 As was seen in section II B above. 
177 Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council [ 1956) AC 736, 751 per Viscount 
Simonds: "It is our plain duty to give the words of an Act their proper meaning . . . " 
178 "[W]hat to an outside observer looks like persistent thwarting of the will of 
Parliament." J Anderson, "Parliament v. Court: The effect of legislative attempts to restrict 
the control of supreme courts over administrative tribunals through the prerogative writs ." 
(1950) I UQU 39, 40. 
179 "[J]ustice shall be so administered only 'after the laws and usages of this realm' .. . The 
phrase 'usages of this realm' means the customary procedures." Bennion Statutory 
Interpretation : A Code (2ed Butterworths, London , 1992) 62, quoting Blackstone's 
Commentaries ed. Kerr (4 ed 1876) iii 22. 
180 For example, with reference to Anisminic, SA de Smith "Judicial Review: The Ever-
open Door?" (1969) 27 CU 161 , 163. 
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fundamental. 181 Repeated suggestions that sufficiently clear statutory 
provisions have yet to be drafted182 would appear absurd given the strong 
terms which have already been used. The approach taken by the courts in 
such instances would appear to bear a strong resemblance to that taken by 
Chief Justice Coke in the 17th century: 183 
"the common law will controul Acts of Parliament, and sometimes 
adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an Act of Parliament is 
against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be 
performed, the common law will controul it. ·· 
It is clear that Parliament may often act hastily 184 and without regard for the 
systematic development of the law, 185 and that divisions within the legislature 
and between legislature and executive no longer provide an adequate check on 
legislation. 186 It would seem however that such concerns would appear better 
served by the establishment of a superior court 187 or by reforms to electoral 
and governmental structures rather than by court intervention which may be 
of limited general effect. 188 
It may be further be suggested that in interpreting privative provisions 
restrictively the courts themselves exceed their jurisdiction, 189 and may, in 
doing so, weaken their overall authority .190 The courts may also be adversely 
affected by well-justified criticism of the often tortuous reasoning employed 
in relation to such provisions. 
It is however difficult to accept that legislative intent is clearly expressed by 
many privative provisions. The strong phrasing of many clauses would, if 
interpreted literally, preclude review in all instances, including patently 
unreasonable actions and those taken in bad faith. Even provisions permitting 
review for want of jurisdiction would not, on a restrictive definition of the 
181 Above n. 148, 990. See also above n. 13 , 729: "the courts have now gone to length of 
making ouster clauses meaningless, inconsistent though this is with the constitutional 
position of the judiciary." 
182 Anisminic v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969) 2 AC 147, 170 per Lord 
Pearce. 
183 DrBonham's Case 77 Eng. Rep. 646,652 KB (1609) 
184 B Schwartz & H WR Wade, Legal Control of Government (Clarendon, Oxford, 1972), 
297 . 
185 Above n. 13, 728. 
186 p Cane, An Introduction to Administrative Law (Clarendon, Oxford, 1992), 343. 
187 Such a body has been proposed by Lord Scarman ("The Development of Administrative 
Law: Obstacles and Opportunities" [ 1990) PL 490, 493), who made the observation that 
the members of such a court would have a more controversial role than that of currently 
played by the judiciary. 
188 Above n. 175. 
189 L Belanger "Corps administratif: bref de prerogative" (1964) 10 McGill U 217, 23 I. 
190 Justice S D O'Connor "Reflections on the preclusion of judicial review in England and 
the United States" (1986) 27 William & Mary LR 643 , 655 : "Pretense surely weakens the 
institutional authority of the judiciary, and hence victories such as Anisminic may not 
come without cost." See also Lord Devlin's reference to "judicial dynamism" which 
undermines public confidence "Judges and Lawmakers" (1976) 39 MLR 1, 5. 
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term, 191 permit review in all such instances. It is possible that the preclusion 
of review on any ground is intended in exceptional cases. 192 However, in 
most instances the strong terms of privative enactments would seem to reflect 
legislative attempts to overcome restrictive interpretation, rather than a broad 
intention to prevent review completely.193 
It is furthermore not unreasonable to suggest that the strength of intention 
which privative enactments should reflect is not present in all the clauses 
which are currently in force. In some instances r~peal would appear suitable; 
in others more moderate restrictive provisions should be substituted for the 
privative enactment. It would however seem difficult, given the unhappy 
history of privative provisions in the courts, to draft a provision which would 
of itself dependably permit of review only in extreme circumstances. 
2 Functional considerations 
Whilst many justifications may be made and disputed for privative 
enactments, ranging from the avoidance of delay to the preservation of 
agency autonomy, 194 it is submitted that these are largely irrelevant when 
considering the literal interpretation of such provisions. It is clear that review 
will not be available in some instances, whether by reason of a privative 
clause or through the exercise of judicial discretion. As has been seen, the 
wishes of the legislature and the courts often coincide. However, the 
approach taken by the courts to some privative enactments indicates that they 
do not always do so. It has been seen that in most instances of disagreement 
the judicial assessment of the desirability of review has taken precedence. 
In addition to the constitutional objections to such precedence, there is a 
strong functional argument in favour of legislative determination of the limits 
of review. Such determination will in most instances involve the evaluation of 
policy and of the broad effect of review. Whilst judicial decisions in such 
matters may be intended to reflect the public interest, 195 the extent to which 
the judiciary are qualified to do so is open to question.196 Such decisions are, 
by contrast, a function to which the legislature is particularly accustomed. 
191 See above n. 40. 
I 92 For example, the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992, s. 9(b) 
(see Appendix Ill). 
193 Above n. 167, 174. 
I 94 See, for example, above n. 171 , 275 - 276. 
195 Above n. 28, 3. 
196 JAG Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary (Manchester University, 1977) 193: 
"These judges have, by their education and training and the pursuit of their profession as 
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V APPROACHES TO REFORM 
A Judicial Compromise 
It has been seen that the approach to privative provisions necessarily involves 
both the courts and the legislature. It w<mld also seem that the current 
position of both is unsatisfactory and in need of reform. Although the courts 
must retain a supervisory function which permits them to safeguard the most 
basic elements of the constitution, their role should be tempered by greater 
respect on the part of the courts for legislative intent. 
A generally more effectual approach to the interpretation of privative 
provisions has been applied by both the Australian and Canadian courts The 
Australian approach dates from the decision in R v. Hickman; exp. Fox and 
Clinton. 197 In essence Justice Dixon held a privative clause to be effectual 
"provided always that the decision is a bona fide attempt to exercise the 
power, that it relates to the subject matter of the legislation, and that it is 
reasonably capable of reference to the power given to the body." I 98 The test 
was extended by R v. Murray, exp. Proctor to require that the exercise not 
be in breach of a statutory requirement so important that the legislature could 
not have intended it to be disregarded. 199 
The Hickman approach has however been criticised for its complexity, which 
may permit some degree of unpredictability200 or manipulation, particularly in 
the application of the supplementary principle.201 It would however appear to 
afford some degree of variance from the judicial interpretation of the relevant 
legislation whilst allowing control of extreme or wilful abuse. 
It must be noted in considering this approach that the Australian Federal 
courts have recourse in some instances to section 75(v) of the Australian 
Constitution,202 which has been held to confer a power of review despite the 
presence of a privative clause in R v. Coldham; ex p. The Australian 
barristers, acquired a strikingly homogeneous collection of attitudes, beliefs and principles, 
which to them represent the public interest." 
197 (1945) 70 CLR 598 . 
198 Above n. 197,615. 
199 (1949) 77 CLR 387. 
200 Above n. 28, 67. 
201 Above n. 141,698. 
202 "In all matters - ... (v) in which a writ of mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is 
sought against an officer of the Commonwealth: ... The High Court shall have original 
jurisdiction." 
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Workers' Union. 203 Whilst it is possible that the greater constitutional 
authority of the Australian courts may mean that they have little cause to adopt 
a more restrictive approach to privative provisions,204 the long history of the 
Hickman approach would appear to indicate that such is not the case. It must 
also be noted that the Court in Coldham approved Hickman. 
The Canadian judiciary have if anything taken a more positive approach, 
holding review in the presence of a privative clause to be available only in 
cases of patent unreasonableness. 205 The C~nadian courts also enjoy a 
constitutionally protected right of review of provincial administrative 
bodies, 206 although as in Australia the more favourable interpretation of 
privative provisions preceded and followed the recognition of that right. 
Recent decisions indicate a still more literal approach than that seen in 
Australia. 207 
Review of administrative actions in United States courts also employs a 
rationality test with reference to some statutes. A distinction is made between 
a general standard of reasonableness in those areas where statutory ambiguity 
may be considered to be a deliberate conferral of broad jurisdiction,208 and a 
rigid standard where ambiguity appears not to be so intended.209 Despite, or 
perhaps more accurately because of, 210 the existence of substantial 
constitutional powers,211 American courts have, at least in recent years, taken 
a deferential attitude to administrative decisions.212 
203 (1983) 153 CLR 415, 418 . Note, however, that the approach taken by Dixon J . in 
Hickman was cited with approval. 
204 Above n. 144, 467. 
205 Canadian Union of Public Employees v. New Brunswick Liquor Corporation (1979) 
SCR 227. Note, however, the decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal in Re Fisher and 
Manitoba Workers Compensation Board (1991) 82 DLR (4th) 104 in which patent 
unreasonableness was held to include bad faith , the taking into account of irrelevant 
considerations or the failure to consider relevant material, breach of natural justice and 
misconstruction of empowering legislation. This view is evidently not universally held: in 
Macdonald v. Commissioner of Business Franchises [1992] I VR 61 I (AD) a privative 
clause was held to preclude review except where the nature of the decision indicated an 
"untenable and absurd" view of the facts. 
206 In Crevier v. Attorney-General for Quebec [ 1981] 2 SCR 220 the review of 
jurisdictional error was held to be fundamentally guaranteed by s. 96 of the Constitution 
Act. The decision of the Supreme Court has been described by one leading constitutional 
scholar as "strained". (P W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (3ed Carswell, Toronto 
1992), 196). 
207 For example, in Re Artex Manufacturing Partnership and Labour Relations Board of 
Canada (1991) 82 DLR (4th) 124, a privative intent was inferred by the Court in the 
absence of any express provision and subjected to the standard test of patent 
unreasonableness. 
208 Chevron USA , Inc. v. Natural Resources Defence Council 467 US 837, 842 - 843 . 
209 Justice A Scalia "Judicial deference to administrative interpretations of law" ( 1989) 
Duke U 511. 
210 Above n. 190, 655. 
211 Marbury v. Madison (1803) 5 U.S . 87, 111 per Marshall CJ "It is, emphatically, the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is ." Note, however, that 
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It is true that the standard of rationality has been developed by courts of 
superior constitutional jurisdiction, and as such may reflect the greater 
confidence arising from the ability of these courts to prevent unconstitutional 
actions by direct means. The retention of restrictive interpretation may be seen 
to provide an alternative means of exercising such control.213 The need for 
such a judicial role is a matter of substantial debate,214 although it would 
seem that in any event restrictive interpretation is a very limited and obscure 
means to that end. 
It may moreover be suggested that a decision between "rightness" and 
"reasonableness" is already made by the New Zealand courts in the 
interpretation of privative provisions,2 15 evidenced by the mention of 
"legitimate room for judgment" in Bulk Gas Users Group. 21 6 Nevertheless, 
considerable scope for greater transparency and consistency remains, in light 
of the criticisms of the approach of the Court of Appeal which have been 
made above. 
The benefits of reviewing administrative decisions subject to privative 
provisions only where wholly unreasonable217 would appear substantial. The 
standard allows considerable autonomy and independence for authorities 
protected by such enactments while allowing review in extreme cases. The 
small number of areas in which complete preclusion of review would appear 
warranted would seem likely to be served by the combination of the high 
threshold of irrationality and the current discretion of the courts. 
As has been noted, however, the stringency of a rationality test is not 
warranted by many current privative enactments. The approach proposed is 
therefore dependent upon a more moderate approach on the part of the 
legislature. 
the position has recently been restated in particular regard to privative clauses in the 
dissenting opinion of O'Connor J in South Carolina v. Regan 465 U.S. 367, 397: "[T]he 
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court has long been thought inviolate. " 
212 For example, Block v. Community Nutrition Institute 467 U.S. 340 (1984), in which 
the Court held that review could be precluded on a broad range of grounds. Note however 
the very extensive criticism of the deferential approach in K C Davis Administrative Law of 
the Eighties (K C Davis, San Diego, 1989), 480 - 481 . 
213 For example, above, n. 187 
214 Above, n. 193. 
215 JA Smillie "The Foundation and Scope of Judicial Review : A comment on Bulk Gas 
Users Group v. Attorney-General" (1984) 5 Otago LR 552,554. 
216 [1983] NZLR 129, 136. 
217 A narrow definition is required : "a decision so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of 
accepted moral standards that no person who had applied his mind to the question to be 
decided could have arrived at it." (Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil 
Service [1985] AC 374,410). 
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B LEGISLATIVE COMPROMISE 
It is however clear that in many instances judicial respect for parliamentary 
intent is currently not warranted. Although it is submitted that privative 
enactments are necessary where legislative intent is so strong as to warrant 
their use, such intent must be the result of extensive consideration. That 
consideration has apparently not occurred. 
Following repeated criticism of the widespread u:e of privative provisions,218 
the British Parliament passed the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1958, which 
had the effect of repealing all privative enactments other than those 
specifically retained.219 At the time of Anisminic, the effect of the Act had 
been to remove all such provisions other than section 4( 4) of the Foreign 
Compensation Act. 220 That status did not, however, give rise to a more 
favourable interpretation.221 The Tribunals and Inquiries Act has since been 
described as legislative acceptance of restrictive interpretation.222 
In Australia the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 confers 
statutory authority upon the Federal Court to review administrative actions 
"notwithstanding anything contained in any enactment in force at the 
Commencement of this Act. "223 The effective repeal of privative enactments 
under the Act is thus limited to those passed prior to the Commencement and 
only applies where the action for review is brought under the Act. 
There are a number of other limitations in the application of the Act, largely as 
a result of section 3(1): 
"a decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made, 
or required to be made, as the case may be (whether in the exercise of a 
discretion or not) under an enactment, other than a decision by the 
Governor-General or a decision included in any of the classes of 
decisions set out in Schedule 1." 
The limits have been extended to some degree by the broad interpretation of 
the requirements of the terms "decision", "administrative character", and 
"under an enactment" by the Federal Court.224 However, further specific 
limitations may be added to Schedule 1 by amendment, or the Act may be 
bypassed altogether by regulation.225 Furthermore, it is to be noted that the 
218 Report of the Committee on Ministers' Powers (Donoughmore Committee) ( 1932) 
Cmd 4060, 65, and Report of the Committee on Tribunals and Inquiries (Franks 
Committee) (1957) Cmnd 218, para. 117. 
21 9 Section 11. 
220 Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969) 2 AC 147, 207 . 
221 [1969) 2 AC 147, 201 (per Lord Pearce), 207 (per Lord Wilberforce). 
222 Above, n. 146. 
223 Section 4. The date of commencement was l October 1980. 
224 Above n. 141 , 243 -- 255 . 
225 Section 19. 
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legislature has not since the passage of the Administrative Decision (Judicial 
Review) Act refrained from enacting new privative provisions, which will 
have effect despite the Act. 226 
The most important function of broad repeal legislation is to give rise to 
further consideration of privative provisions. In the courts such consideration 
must attach to the fact that the legislature has recognised the forceful nature of 
privative enactments and chosen to repeal all but certain specified provisions. 
Whilst the reaction of the English courts to such legislation was 
understandable in the context of their past approach to privative provisions, it 
would seem that if repeal is intended as a means of reform it must be 
recognised as such. 
Legislative consideration occurs both at the time of repeal, in deciding which 
provisions should be retained, and afterwards, in the decision to enact 
privative clauses despite the presence of the Act. Such consideration would 
seem likely to ease concerns over too liberal use of privative provisions, 
either where statutory restriction of review is unnecessary or where the 
degree of restriction intended warrants only a more a more moderate 
provision. It is of course possible that no extant provision may be considered 
so necessary. It is clear, however, that should the legislature perceive such a 
need it must be capable of implementing that perception. 
Such a result would appear ill-served by legislation which is easily ignored or 
avoided. It is submitted that whilst legislative recognition of the process of 
compromise might ideally have such an effect, a requirement requiring notice 
in Parliament at the passage of any provision akin to section 7 of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 may have greater practical effect. 227 
226 GD S Taylor "The Limits of Judicial Review" (1986) 12 NZULR 178, 191 notes the 
enactment of three new privative provisions between the date of assent to the Act and its 
coming into force. The long delay before the Act came into force must however be borne in 
mind. 
227 "Where any Bill is introduced into the House of Representatives, the Attorney-General 
shall - (a) In the case of a Government Bill, on the introduction of that Bill; or (b) In any 
other case, as soon as practicable after the introduction of the Bill, - bring to the attention 
of the House of Representatives any provision in the Bill that appears to be inconsistent 
with any of the rights and freedom contained in this Bill of Rights." 
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V CONCLUSION 
The right to apply for judicial review is a central element of constitutional 
law. Whilst it is used only in a small proportion of disputes, review remains 
available as an authoritative, independent and public means of ensuring the 
legality of the administration of government. Whilst it must not be permitted 
to frustrate the will of the legislature, it i-, a right which should not be 
removed without good reason. The fact that goocl reasons exist - that review 
is inappropriate in some areas - has been recognised by the courts in their 
decisions not to review. 
The continued passage of privative provisions would, however, indicate a 
legislative lack of faith in the consistency of judicial discretion. It would, 
given the instances in which review has been granted despite the presence of 
a privative clause, appear that the distrust is justified. For practical as well as 
constitutional reasons, disagreement over the availability of review would 
seem best resolved in favour of the legislature. 
However, many of the clauses currently in force do not appear to justify the 
forceful terms in which they are expressed. Whilst express privative 
provisions may be warranted as an expression of particularly strong 
legislative intent, it would seem clear that other statutory devices may be used 
where that intent is more moderate. Where that intent no longer exists, as 
appears likely in the case of many older provisions, broad repeal is both 
straightforward and necessary. 
It would furthermore seem clear that even where justified, most privative 
provisions are phrased in such strong terms that their literal application is 
almost certainly contrary to the intention of Parliament. 
There remains, therefore, a significant role for the courts even in the presence 
of a privative clause. The current judicial approach to such provisions seems 
unlikely to accord such clauses any real effect. An approach based upon a 
broad rationality test would appear likely to do so while restricting abuse. The 
constitutional background against which such tests have been developed in 
other jurisdictions would not appear to detract from their merits. 
Many eminent members of the legal profession and of the judiciary have 
called for greater method and simplicity in administrative law. The obscurity 
and confusion of the law relating to privative clauses is evident. It is a credit 
neither to the wisdom of Parliament nor to the sense of the courts. It is the 
responsibility of both institutions to reach a more appropriate and more open 
compromise. 
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APPENDIX I: Privative clauses identified using STATUS Search 
"Lack of Appeal 
Name and date of Act Section Subject-matter Decision-maker jurisdiction" provision Reference 
Judicature 1908 s. 56N General Australian Courts No. No. n. 77 
Pawnbrokers 1908 s. 41 Summary judgment Justice of the Peace No. No. n. 76 
River Boards 1908 s. 41 Removal from office District Court No. No. 
Bylaws 1910 s. 9. Confirmation of by laws Minister No. No. 
Electric Power Boards 1925 s. 25 Removal from office District Court No. No. 
Auckland Transport Board 1925 s. 14. Removal from office District Court No. No. 
Companies (Bondholders s. 29 Bondholders Commission Yes. High 
Incorporation) 1934-35 incorporation Court. 
Mortgagors and Lessees s. 22 Review of leases High Court No. No. 
Rehabilitation 1936 
Marketing 1936 s. 23 Price fixing Order in Council No. No. n. 30, 
124 
International Air Services s. 19 Airline licenses Minister Yes. No. 
Licensing 194 7 
Land 1948 s. 173 Various Various No. No. 
Cooperative Dairy Companies 1949 s. 19 Various Tribunal Yes. High 
Boilers, Lifts and Cranes 1950 s. 57 Summary judgment District Court No. No. 
Harbours 1950 s. 34 Ouster of office District Court No. No. 
Machinery 1950 s. 35 Summary judgment District Court No. No. n. 83 
Penal Institutions 1954 s. 41B Damages claims District Court Yes. High 
Court. 
Maori Reserved Land 1955 s. 74 Land valuation Appeal body Yes. No. 
Electoral 1956 s. 168 Electoral High Court No. No. n. 75 
Police 1958 s. 62 Minor offences District Court Yes. No. 
Copyright 1962 s. 48 Copyright Tribunal Yes. No. 
Niue 1966. s. 67 Land Land Court / Land No. No. 1 
Appellate Court 
s. 125 General Niuean Courts No. No. 2 n. 77 
Diplomatic Privileges and s. 20 Diplomatic immunity Minister No. No. n. 102 
Immunities 1968 
New Zealand Security Intelligence s. 4A3 Interception warrant Minister No. No. n. 31, 
Service 1969 109, 114 
s. 20 Security complaints Commissioner Yes. No. n. 109 
Public Bodies Leases 1969 s. 3 Status of public body Minister No.4 No. n. 123 
Armed Forces Discipline 1971 s. 143 General Court-martial No. Yes.5 
1 Appeal to Land Appellate Court from Land Court. 
2 Appeal rights as provided within Niuean Court system. 
3 Note also s. 4A(9) : "This section shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other Act." 
4 The section applies to all notices "by the Minister purporting to have been issued under this Act", and review for want of jurisdiction is expressly excluded. 
5 See Court Martials Appeals Act 1953. 
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Race Relations 1971 s. 19. Race relations Conciliator Yes. No . n. 122 
Ombudsman 197 5 s. 25 General Ombudsman Yes. No. n. 87, 
101 
Local Elections and Polls 1976 s. 108. Disputed elections District Court No. Yes.* n. 82 
Territorial Sea and Exclusive s. 21 Fishing licenses Minister No. No. n. 102 
Economic Zone 1977 
Fisheries 19836 s. 28ZGA Fishing quota Director-General I No. No. n. 127 
allocation. (transitional) Quota Appeal Authority 
Immigration 1987 s. 10 Visas Minister I visa officer No . No. n. 107 
Sale of Liquor 1989 s. 203 Removal from office District Court No. No. 
Serious Fraud Office 1990 s. 20 Investigations Director of Office No. No . n. 117 
Employment Contracts 1991 s. 104 Labour relations Employment Court Yes.7 Yes.
8 n. 86 
Resource Management 1991 s. 391 Relevant statute Licensing I consent No . No. n. 127 
(transitional) authority 
s. 422 Relevant statute Territorial authority No . No. n. 127 
(transitional) 
s. 423 Relevant statute Minister No. No. n. 125 
(transitional) 
Treaty of W aitangi (Fisheries Claims) s. 9 Fishing rights NIA NIA No . 
6 Section inserted by the Finance Act (No. 6) 1992. 
7 Note, however, the definition of "jurisdiction" given in s. I 04(6). 
8 Extensive appeal rights provided in ss. 132 - I 35 of the Act. 
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Settlement 1992 
Maori Land Act Te Ture 
Whenua Maori 1993 
s. 348 Land 
(transitional) 
Maori Land Court 
and its predecessors 
No. No . n. 126 
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APPENDIX II: Table of other legislation considered 
Name and date of Act 
Arbitration Act 1901 (NSW) 
District Courts 194 7 
Foreign Compensation Act 1950 (UK) 
Summary Proceedings 1957 
Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1958 
Antarctica 1960 
Indecent Publications 1963 
Consular Privileges and 
Immunities 1971 
Section Comment (where applicable) 
s. 32 
s. 64 No review for want of form. 
s. 204 No review for want of form except in case of miscarriage of justice. 
s. 6 
s. 12 
s. 9 
Certificate of Minister as to immunity to be conclusive evidence. 
Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction to determine indecency. 
Certificate of Minister as to immunity to be conclusive evidence. 
Discretion not to review for want of form 
Reference 
n. 32 
n. 120 
n. 156 
n. 120 
n. 219 
n. 113 
n. 95 
n. 113 
n. 119 Judicature Amendment 1972 
Marine Pollution 1974 
s. 5 
s. 67 Certificate of Minister as to parties to international agreements conclusive evidence. 
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Australia) 
Wild Animal Control Act 1977 
Video Recordings 1987 
Children, Young Persons and 
their Families 1989, s. 440. 
s. 25( 4) Finality provision 
s. 20(1) Decision of the Authority or of the Board of Review conclusive evidence. 
s. 440 No review for want of form except in case of miscarriage of justice. 
n. 223 -
255 
n. 17 
n. 26, 95 
n. 120 
38 
Sale of Liquor 1989 s. 148 Exhaustion requirement 
Casino Control Authority 1990 s. 98 Exhaustion requirement 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 SS. 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 27 (1) 
n. 94 
n. 29, 94 
n. 157 -
166, 227 
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APPENDIX III: Sections 8 and 9 of the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) 
Settlement Act 1992. 
9. EFFECT OF SETTLEMENT ON COMMERCIAL MAORI FISHING 
RIGHTS AND INTERESTS-- It is hereby declared that--
(a) All claims (current and future) by Maori in respect of commercial fishing--
(i) Whether such claims are founded on rights arising by or in common law 
(including customary law and aboriginal title), the Treaty of Waitangi, statute, or 
otherwise; and 
(ii) Whether in respect of sea, coastal, or inland fisheries, including any 
commercial aspect of traditional fishing; and 
(iii) Whether or not such claims have been the subject uf adjudication by the 
courts or any recommendation from the Waitangi Tribunal,--
having been acknowledged, and having been satisfied by the benefits provided to 
Maori by the Crown under the Maori Fisheries Act 1989, this Act, and the Deed of 
Settlement referred to in the Preamble to this Act, are hereby finally settled; and 
accordingly 
(b) The obligations of the Crown to Maori in respect of commercial fishing are 
hereby fulfilled, satisfied, and discharged; and no court or tribunal shall have 
jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of such claims, the existence of rights and 
interests of Maori in commercial fishing, or the quantification thereof, the validity 
of the Deed of settlement referred to in the Preamble to this Act, or the adequacy of 
the benefits to Maori referred to in paragraph ( a) of this section; and 
(c) All claims (current and future) in respect of, or directly or indirectly based on, 
rights and interest of Maori in commercial fishing are hereby fully and finally 
settled, satisfied, and discharged. 
10. EFFECT OF SETTLEMENT ON NON-COMMERCIAL MAORI 
FISHING RIGHTS AND INTERESTS-- It is hereby declared that claims by 
Maori in respect of non-commercial fishing for species or classes of fish, aquatic or 
seaweed that are subject to the Fisheries Act 1983--
( a) Shall, in accordance with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, continue to 
give rise to Treaty obligations on the Crown; and in pursuance thereto 
(b) The Minister, acting in accordance with the principles of the Treaty of W aitangi, 
shall--
(i) Consult with tangata whenua about; and 
(ii) Develop policies to help recognise--
use and management practices of Maori in the exercise of non-commercial fishing 
rights; and 
(c) The Minister shall recommend to the Governor-General in Council the making 
of regulations pursuant to section 89 of the Fisheries Act 1983 to recognise and 
provide for customary food gathering by Maori and the special relationship 
between tangata whenua and those places which are of customary food gathering 
importance (including tauranga ika and mahinga mataitai), to the extent that such 
food gathering is neither commercial in any way nor for pecuniary gain or 
trade; but 
(d) The rights or interests of Maori in non-commercial fishing giving rise to such 
claims, whether such claims are founded on rights arising by or in common law 
(including customary law and aboriginal title), the Treaty of W aitangi, statute, or 
otherwise, shall henceforth have no legal effect, and accordingly--
(i) Are not enforceable in civil proceedings; and 
(ii) Shall not provide a defence to any criminal, regulatory, or other proceeding, 
-- except to the extent that such rights or interests are provided for in regulations 
made under section 89 of the Fisheries Act 1983. 
(Emphasis added) 
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